This paper examines the e¤ects of patience on ordinary con ‡icts such as divorce, price wars and commercial litigation. Players optimally decide when, if ever, to start a destructive confrontation. In the unique equilibrium, there is a tight connection between patience, aggressiveness and strength. In particular patience may lead to immediate confrontation (the most ine¢ cient outcome). This ine¢ ciency is caused by preemptive moves that deny option values to the opponent.
The basic trade-o¤ in repeated games is whether to take a costly action that may induce the adversary to behave more favorably in the future. Hence, patience is necessary to induce mutually bene…cial behavior. In this model, the basic trade-o¤ is that waiting delivers an option value (i.e., the opportunity to start the actual con ‡ict in more favorable terms). However, waiting also delivers the opponent an option value. So, the e¤ects of patience in this game are, a priory, unclear. The option of waiting for a better opportunity to attack is more valuable to a more patient player. On the other hand, more patient players su¤er greater disutility from delivering the opponent this option value. The formal analysis reveals that the results of patience are, in fact, unambiguous. The bene…t of the former option value is dominated by the loss associated with the latter.
The results mentioned above assumed parity of strength (i.e., the odds of victory are generated, ex-ante, in a way that does not favor either player) and this is commonly known. Now consider the case where there is uncertainty about relative strength. This uncertainty is a potential deterrent for confrontations. So, one side is intrinsically stronger, but, initially, it is unknown which one. After several opportunities arise, players can learn about their relative strength. Here, the basic trade-o¤ continues at a higher level. If a player does not stop the learning process (i.e., attacks) then this player obtains valuable knowledge, but this also grants the adversary the same knowledge.
This process is closely related to a game-theoretic bandit problem where players learn by experimentation. In this model, the bandits are negatively correlated, good news for one player is bad news for the other. However, the main novelty, compared to the existing game-theoretic literature on social experimentation (see, for example, Bolton and Harris (1999) and Rosenberg, Solan, and Vieille (2007) ), is that one player stopping or continuing the learning process has more than an informational e¤ect on the other player: it is also directly payo¤-relevant for the other player.
Our main results are as follows: Uncertainty about relative strength does not ensure peace. This ine¢ ciency cannot be resolved by patience, no matter how great. Moreover, if a player is revealed to be intrinsically stronger, then, for this player, greater patience leads to less aggressiveness. A weaker, more patient player attacks sooner. With perceived superior strength, it pays to wait before striking. In more vulnerable conditions, preemptive strikes are required. These results identify the key conditions under which patience is conducive to aggressiveness: relative strength is the key mediator on the relationship between patience and aggressiveness.
Our basic model is a stopping game. Stopping games are a natural framework for a wide variety of economic phenomena. While related to bargaining models and to repeated games, they are not nearly as used as these models. This is, in part, due to the fact that beyond existence of equilibria and, sometimes their value, little is known about stopping games. We characterize equilibria and more importantly obtain comparative statics results even when social experimentation is added to the model. We hope that our novel methods are a …rst step towards a widespread use of stopping games.
After a brief literature review, Section 2 introduces the game of con ‡ict. The case of known strength is in Section 3. The learning model is in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. Proofs are in the appendix.
Relation with the Existing Literature
The ine¢ ciency of con ‡ict has been widely studied in the political economy literature. Gar…nkel and Skaperdas (2007) is an extensive survey, but see also Fearon (1995) , Powell (1999) , Powell (2004) , Powell (2006) , Dal Bó, Hernán-dez, and Mazzuca (2015) . The political economy literature focuses on the understanding of the existence of ine¢ cient inter-state wars, and how institutions can a¤ect and prepare for them. We focus on everyday con ‡icts, the question of when to start a confrontation and the relation between patience, strength and aggressiveness. In addition, most of the political economy literature uses static models. There are notable exceptions. For example, Powell (1993) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) consider dynamic elements in a model fundamentally di¤erent from ours.
Our setting eventually divides a constant sum and so, can be related to bargaining models. We do not survey this large literature. Serrano (2007) provides an extensive survey, but see also Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) and Roth (1985) . In Abreu and Gul (2000) and Compte and Jehiel (2002) , players decide when to take action (concede). This gives higher payo¤s to the other side. In our model, acting is to …ght which never yields higher expected payo¤s to the other side. Bargaining typically has a war of attrition structure. Our model does not have a war of attrition structure because the status-quo is e¢ cient (peace) and the decisive action leads to an ine¢ cient confrontation.
Single player stopping problems is also a large literature that we do not survey here. The current state of the art on the e¤ects of discount rates in stopping problems is the work by Quah and Strulovici (2013) . Under suitable conditions, our methods extend their decision theoretic results to a game theoretic framework.
The literature on stochastic games typically deals with more general problems such as existence of equilibria and sometimes, their value (see, for example, Shapley (1953) , Mertens and Parthasarathy (1991) , Solan and Vieille (2002) ) with a main focus in irreducible games. A related strand in stochastic games considers games with absorbing states, where the game is reducible (when players' actions may change the game permanently). In particular Wiseman (2017) studies a game of repeated oligopoly, where …rms might enter a price war and be forced to exit the market. Unlike our game, in Wiseman (2017) players have a strong incentive to induce the other players to exit the game. As long as players haven't exited, the oligopoly setting allows for intertemporal trade of continuation payo¤s to avoid a price war. Even though there are no issues of dimensionality in the stage game, an antifolk theorem is also obtained, in the sense that collusion is not sustainable. Our results are obtained under di¤erent conditions. In our setting when one player stops the game the other player typically receives low payo¤s and cannot continue the game. Despite the di¤erences in settings, the anti-folk theorems highlights the importance of reducibility in stochastic games. In fact our anti-folk result which arises due to reducibility is also in line with the sharp observation in Sorin (1986) where a stochastic discounted game with absorbing states (hence reducible) has a unique equilibrium payo¤ regardless of the discount factor.
Within stochastic games we build upon the work in stopping games (see Dynkin (1969) , Neveu (1975) , Yasuda (1985) , Rosenberg, Solan, and Vieille (2001) , Szajowski (1993) , Shmaya and Solan (2004) , Ekstrom and Villeneuve (2006), Ohtsubo (1987) ). Stopping games are reducible. In many reducible games, it is di¢ cult to obtain much more than existence of equilibria. We build upon Ohtsubo (1987) for characterizing equilibria and we utilize either direct calculations or the single player techniques of Quah and Strulovici (2013) on an extension of the Snell (1952) Envelope to achieve our comparative statics. The Snell envelope is a general, but mostly intractable, solution to stopping problems. We side step intractability by utilizing martingale techniques, focusing on ordering payo¤s.
As mentioned in the introduction, our learning model resembles a social bandit problem where players learn by experimentation (see Bolton and Harris (1999) , Bergemann and Välimäki (1996) and Rosenberg, Solan, and Vieille (2007) ). Klein and Rady (2011) consider negatively correlated bandits, where good news for one player is bad news for the other. However, in our model, when one player stops so must the other. Hence, in our model, the actions of one player are not only informationally relevant to the other player and, in this sense, indirectly payo¤-relevant and but also directly payo¤-relevant as they may change the game itself. This direct payo¤ relevance signi…-cantly changes the strategic interaction and required us to develop a novel approach. Here, we build upon techniques developed by Ohtsubo (1987) for characterizing the equilibria.
Basic Model and Notation

The game
There are two players 1 and 2. At each period either player either starts a confrontation (…ght) or not. If neither player engages in a …ght, they get 0 payo¤s that period and the game continues. If one player starts a confrontation, the opponent cannot avoid it and the game ends with one player defeated. The winner gets utility v > 0, and the loser utility l, l > 0; l > v. So, confrontations are destructive: the payo¤ of victory (v) is less than the disutility of defeat (l).
1 In case of a confrontation at period t, player 1 is the victor with probability p t : At the beginning of each period, both players observe player 1's probability of winning (hence player 2's probability of winning which is, 1 p t ). Thus, players choose whether to start a confrontation after observing the odds of victory. The probability p t of the player 1 winning a confrontation is produced by a random variablep t with continuous probability density and full support in [0; 1]. Both players discount future payo¤s with a common, constant discount factor 2 (0; 1). Both players have a common belief over the distribution ofp t .
Players 1 and 2 are in a potential con ‡ict. The key question is whether and if so when one of them will strategically escalate the con ‡ict in an irreversible payo¤-relevant move. For example, consider two companies facing idiosyncratic shocks to costs and demands and deciding when to start a confrontation which can be in the form of a price war, a break o¤ from an informal collusion or an aggressive marketing campaign. In the case of a troubled marriage, the open confrontation may occur when one of the par-ties …les for divorce and dispute, say, child-custody. A similar case occurs in commercial litigation, where the evidence/contractual claims can be changing before it goes to court. So, going to trial is confronting the opponent. In many, but not all, cases there is a natural point that can be construed as the start of the confrontation at its earnest. A signi…cant limitation in our setting is that once the confrontation starts there are no more strategic interactions. While this limits the applicability of our model, it helps focus our results on the issue of when to start the con ‡ict.
Strategies
The history at period t; h t = (p 0 ; p 1 ; : : : ; p t ); is the sequence of probabilities of winning for player 1 up to period t. Given that the game ends if a player starts a confrontation, we implicitly assume that no player has started a confrontation if a history is relevant for decision making. The set of all histories generate a growing sequence of -algebras, (h t ) for the process fp t g or equivalently a …ltration for fp t g, denoted by fF t g. The probability triple (i.e., the …ltered probability space) is given by ( ; fF t g; P); where is the set of all histories, i.e., = S 1 t=1 [0; 1] t , and P is the probability measure over . Let E be the expectation operator associated with P. Unless otherwise noted, we assume that (p t+1 jF t ) has a continuous density with full support on [0; 1] for all t and its realizations are denoted p t . For consistency, with a slight abuse we assume time starts at the end of period 1 with a trivial algebra, right before p 0 is realized.
A pure strategy takes …nite histories as input and returns, as output, the choice of whether to start a confrontation. We formalize pure strategies (in a way that is common in stopping games) as follows: De…nition 1. A pure strategy is a stopping time for the …ltration F t : 2 So, a pure strategy determines when to confront, depending on the current and (perhaps) past odds of victory. Given a history at period t, a player starts a confrontation at this history if and only if = t. For example, consider the hitting strategy with a …xed threshold 1 = inff t 0 j p t pg. In this strategy, player 1 starts the confrontation when the current odds of victory are greater than p. Let i be player i's pure strategy, i = 1; 2.
Given a pure strategy pro…le = ( 1 ; 2 ), the game ends at 1^ 2 = min( 1 ; 2 ). So, the overall payo¤ to players is given by
Players'payo¤s can also be written in a more compact form as follows:
2.2.1 Equilibrium De…nition 2. A pair of stopping times = ( 1 ; 2 ) is an equilibrium if
That is, a pair of stopping times = ( 1 ; 2 ) is an equilibrium if there are no pro…table unilateral deviations from them. So, in equilibrium, each player best responds to the opponent's plans. In this de…nition only pure strategies are considered. In the appendix, we consider mixed strategies and show that even if mixed strategies are allowed, the equilibrium payo¤ set remains the same.
Remark 1 (Mutually assured destruction). The pair of strategies where players start a confrontation at every history is always an equilibrium.
Once a player commits to …ghting the other one can not back o¤. Hence, mutually assured destruction is always an equilibrium because if the opponent always attacks then anything is a best response. However these strategies are weakly dominated as players start confrontations even when they have almost no chance of winning.
3 For the remainder of the paper, we disregard this equilibrium and focus on non-dominated strategies.
De…nition 3.
i is a …ghting strategy if P (
So, there is no lasting peace in …ghting strategies. If …ghting strategies are employed in equilibrium, we call it a …ghting equilibrium. Due to the destructive nature of the confrontation, any …ghting equilibrium is Pareto dominated by inde…nite peace.
Remark 2 (Equilibria only in Fighting Strategies) . Equilibria has to be in …ghting strategies.
When facing a destructive confrontation where span of the odds of victory is broad enough (i.e., the odds of victory can take values anywhere within bounds close to 0 and 1), …ghting has to eventually occur. At one point, victory will be near certain for one side and that point, the player with favorable odds should start the confrontation. Both players know this and, hence, there is no hope for inde…nite peace. This inevitability of …ghting is also essential in characterizing the set of equilibrium payo¤s as well. Once the confrontation happens, no matter the odds, the payo¤s to the players is a constant sum (v l). The argument is slightly more involved but like a oneshot constant sum game, there is a unique pair of equilibrium values in our game. The uniqueness result can be found in Yasuda (1985) and makes use of a minmax like argument on a value operator, the value characterization is done by Ohtsubo (1987) by a backward induction like argument again using a value operator starting from the moment where the confrontation occurs. We include adapted versions of both results in the appendix for completeness. 3 Consider the mutually assured destruction strategy of player 1, 1;M ad = inff t 0 j p t 0g; and consider the alternative strategy 1;1=2 , where player 1 confronts at period 0 if and only if p 0 1=2 and confronts in every other period at any history. For any strategy of player 2,
2 ), with strictly inequality for some strategies of player 2. To see this observe that, in histories such that p 0 < 1=2, and 2 > 0 the payo¤ associated with 1;M ad is strictly less than v l 2 < 0, whereas 1;1=2 yields a payo¤ of
2 . In all other histories, the two strategies produce the same payo¤s. By a similar logic any strategy that prescibes certain …ghting based on calendar time alone and disregards the current odds are also dominated and we disregard those as well.
Aggressiveness
Aggressiveness is measured by the tendency to confront early on. Consider player 1's hitting strategy with a …xed threshold of attacking when the odds of victory p t are above p 1 . The lower the threshold p 1 the less demanding the odds of victory player 1 requires to start a confrontation. Hence, the lower the threshold p 1 the more aggressive player 1 is. Analogously, consider player 2's hitting strategy with a …xed threshold of attacking when player 1's odds of victory p t are below p 2 (and, hence, player 2's odds of victory 1 p t are above 1 p 2 ). The higher the threshold p 2 the less demanding the odds of victory player 2 requires to start a war. Hence, the higher the threshold p 2 the more aggressive player 2 is. Therefore, in the special case of hitting strategies, aggressiveness can be de…ned by the thresholds p 1 and p 2 : We also consider a de…nition of the impact of patience on aggressiveness that does not rely on hitting strategies. This broader de…nition of aggressiveness is particularly useful in the learning model. Letting i ( ) denote the equilibrium stopping time for player i associated with the discount factor ; De…nition 4. For player i's pure strategies i ( ); i (^ ). A more patient player is more aggressive at time t if for any s t
whenever ^ : Conversely, at time t, a more patient player is less aggressive if this inequality holds with the roles of and^ reversed.
So, an increase in patience makes the player more aggressive if the strategies with higher discount factor increase the odds of starting the confrontation within any …nite time frame.
Strength
In this model, the stronger party is not assured to win a …ght, but strength delivers better odds of victory. We formalize strength as follows:
De…nition 5 (Expectations of Imminent Confrontation).
t is the expected payo¤ of player 1 at period t, if a confrontation starts in that period. Analogously, w 2 t is the expected payo¤ of player 2 at period t, if a confrontation starts in that period. These values are exogenously given and are not related to the strategies chosen by the players.
De…nition 6 (Intrinsic Strength). Player i is intrinsically strong if for all t, E(w i t ) > 0: So, player i is intrinsically strong if, at any period, ex-ante (i.e., before the odds of victory are realized) the expected payo¤ of a confrontation is greater than the payo¤ obtained in peace. It is not possible for both sides to be strong, but it is possible that neither is (e.g., when there is parity in power).
Known Strength
We …rst examine a special case where both players have equal intrinsic strength and they know it. This determines the extent to which parity in strength and the destructive nature of confrontations can ensure peace and hence, e¢ ciency. Theorem 1. Assume that player 1's probability of victory p t is uniform i.i.d., over [0; 1] and this is commonly known. There is a unique set of sustainable payo¤s in equilibrium. These payo¤s are supported by …ghting strategies, given by hitting strategies with …xed thresholds p 1 < 1 and p 2 > 0:
So, parity of power does not ensure peace. Theorem 1 shows that the destructive nature of confrontations is not a su¢ cient deterrent either. Once the odds of victory tilts su¢ ciently towards one side, the confrontation starts. That is, the equilibrium is in …ghting strategies and, hence, ine¢ cient.
The closed-form solutions in Theorem 1 are obtained through a combination of straightforward calculations along with the existence of Markovian equilibria in Mertens (2002) , and a key result in Yasuda (1985) to ascertain that there is a unique pair of equilibrium payo¤s. We show that, in our model, any Markovian equilibria is also in hitting strategies with …xed thresholds. Hence, there exists an equilibria in hitting strategies with …xed thresholds. With some algebra, we obtain closed-form solutions for such an equilibrium.
The intuitive reason for a unique pair of sustainable values is reducibility. After a confrontation the game ends, thus there is no way to make subgame perfect threats that would enlarge the set of equilibrium payo¤s. The …ghting strategies identi…ed here are not necessarily the only pair of strategies that sustain the equilibrium payo¤s, but any other pair of equilibrium strategies (possibly mixed) sustain the same payo¤s. Thus, we focus on …ghting strategies given by hitting strategies with …xed thresholds because, with them, we can calculate an equilibrium in closed-form. This permits direct comparative statics results. Paradoxically, we now show that the destructive nature of confrontations makes patience conducive to hasty engagements. Corollary 1. In equilibrium, both players become more aggressive as the discount factor increases. A confrontation arises almost immediately as players become fully patient (i.e., p 1 and p 2 converge to 0:5 as goes to 1).
The relationship between patience and aggressiveness is unambiguous. More patient players are more aggressive. As the players become completely patient, with near certainty, the confrontation starts immediately. This follows even if the odds of victory in the …rst period are such that the confrontation is ex-ante damaging for both sides.
Corollary 1 is seemingly in contrast with commonsensical ideas on the relationship between patience and aggressiveness. An appeal to patience is often understood as an appeal to peace and tranquility, but seldom, if ever, to aggressivity. Indeed forgoing an opportunity to attack delivers an option value. It gives the player a chance to confront the opponent in better terms in the future. More patient players obtain greater discounted utility from this option value. However, forgoing an opportunity to attack can be fatal because it also grants enemies the option value of starting the confrontation under better conditions for them. This discounted disutility is greater if the player is more patient. Overall, given that confrontations are destructive, the incremental disutility of granting an option value to the opponent surpasses the additional bene…t from obtaining an option value. More patient players have a greater incentive to preempt the opponent and start the con ‡ict earlier since the discounted expected disutility of future destructive confrontations are enhanced. Hence, they are more aggressive.
The setting of theorem 1, features an i.i.d. distribution and parity in strength. In this sense, this is the closest setting to a repeated game, permitted by our framework. Yet, the results are strikingly di¤erent from those in repeated games. Unlike folk theorems, there is a unique pair of equilibrium payo¤s. More patient players …ght sooner, diminishing expected payo¤s to a minimum as they become more patient. So, patience does not enable players to approach Pareto e¢ cient behavior (which would be inde…nite peace). Instead, it leads to the most extreme ine¢ ciency. Unlike repeated games, where patience is instrumental for welfare, patience leads to an immediate destructive confrontation in this game.
The e¤ect of patience in parity of strength can be reinforced by the idea that, in equilibrium, the increased levels of aggressiveness hold even if we …x the discount of the opponent as shown below:
2 ) be the equilibrium strategies associated with the di¤erent discount factors (under Theorem 1's setting):
Corollary 2. In equilibrium, for any discount factor with 1 = 2 = and for any period t 0,
So, in equilibrium, a more patient player is also more aggressive, even when the discount factor of the other player remains the same.
In this section, we made assumptions that were meant to simplify enough the notoriously di¢ cult stopping games so that it becomes su¢ ciently tractable to obtain close-form solutions and comparative statics results. This allows for insights that we now show are robust in more complex settings. In particular, we relax key assumptions and introduce social experimentation into this model.
Unknown Strength and Learning
In a con ‡ict players may not know how comparatively powerful their adversaries are. This uncertainty is a potential deterrent for confrontation and is now captured in a learning model. Players learn about their relative strengths by observing the opportunities arising, while still deciding when to confront. This …ts well with everyday con ‡icts because it allows for underlying trends that need to be learned. For example, in commercial litigation if one side has a more legitimate claim then the evidence that is slowly gathered will tend to favor that side. Similarly, in case of a potential dispute over child custody, there are trends in the parents careers that e¤ect their ability to provide for the child.
As before, there are changing opportunities to engage in a confrontation. If neither side start a confrontation early on, both players observe these opportunities and infer from them the odds of victory in each period and also, in part, the process generating these odds. So, this is a stopping game with social experimentation. Now, waiting is an opportunity to learn the relative strengths and conversely either player attacking concludes the learning period for both players.
Each player now faces two di¤erent drawbacks and two di¤erent bene…ts in starting a confrontation. Fighting early on forgoes the opportunity to learn more about the relative strength before the confrontation starts. Hence, it forgoes critical information for a proper decision. Moreover, …ghting also forgoes the opportunity of starting the confrontation in better terms. On the other hand, …ghting early on precludes the opponent to obtain the same opportunities for learning and for determining the timing of the confrontation. So, the basic trade-o¤ is whether the option value from not …ghting exceeds the disutility of granting this option values to the opponent. But now this trade-o¤ has the extra complexity coming from the uncertainty over relative strength and the value of experimentation. So, assume that the i.i.d. process that generates the odds of victory is either coming from a distribution F 1 or F 2 : Both distributions have continuous densities f 1 and f 2 with full support in [0; 1]. We further assume that f 1 (x) = f 2 (1 x) and so if a distribution favors one of the players, the other distribution favors the other player in the same way. In the …rst distribution, F 1 , player 1 is intrinsically strong. So, in distribution F 2 , player 2 is intrinsically strong. The players share the same non-degenerate prior. 4 Let t denote the posterior belief, at period t, that player 1 is intrinsically strong. In this setting, good news for one player is bad news for the other, like in a negatively correlated bandit setting.
The main novelty in this model is that there are two di¤erent ways in which the experimentation of one player a¤ects the other player. If a player decides to …ght then, like in other game theoretic models of experimentation (e.g. Bolton and Harris (1999) and Rosenberg, Solan, and Vieille (2007) ), this has an indirect e¤ect on the payo¤s on the other player because the opponent can no longer obtain critical information. However, in addition to the interactions through information, there is also a direct e¤ect on the payo¤s of the other player. The payo¤s of the opponent changes when the confrontation starts. Uncertainty about relative strength may make players hesitant to confront their adversaries. Hence, this uncertainty is a potential deterrent for con ‡ict, but, as we show, it is not an e¤ective deterrent. In our model the uncertainty diminishes, but it is never fully resolved in …nite time. In spite of this uncertainty the players stop the process in …nite time and attack. This follows because players are once again reluctant to give option values to the opponent.
Our main results show that there is a unique sustainable payo¤, which is supported by …ghting strategies. Hence, the equilibrium is never e¢ cient. Uncertainty about relative strength is not enough to ensure inde…nite peace, no matter how patient players might be. Moreover, the model is still tractable enough to deliver clear comparative static results.
Our results are formalized as follows: for player 1; the expected payo¤ of a confrontation next period is E w 1 t+1 jF t = E w 1 t+1 j t . For player 2, it is E w 2 t+1 jF t = E w 2 t+1 j t : Assume that t is su¢ ciently high at period t so that E w 1 t+1 j t > 0. Then, the belief that player 1 is strong is su¢ ciently …rm so that player 1 has, ex-ante, a positive expected valuation for a confrontation next period (even though the confrontation is destructive). In this case, we say that players believe that player 1 is intrinsically strong at period t. The same terminology applies to player 2, with w 2 t+1 replacing w 1 t+1 . Theorem 2. There is a unique set of sustainable payo¤s in equilibrium. These payo¤s are supported by …ghting strategies. Moreover, if player i is believed to be intrinsically strong at period t, then a more patient player i is less aggressive at period t. If player i is not believed to be intrinsically strong at period t, then a more patient player i is more aggressive.
So, for a (believed to be) strong player, greater patience leads to less aggressiveness. On the other hand, if a player's strength is not believed to be su¢ ciently great then higher patience leads to more aggressiveness.
Thus, perception of strength is critical in con ‡icts. Even when the relative strength must be learned, the perception of strength is a key mediator in the relationship between patience and aggressiveness.
The trade-o¤ between the option value of waiting for both player versus denying both players this option value delivers the critical insight in Theorem 2. A strong player can a¤ord to wait for better future opportunities because the opponent is less likely to bene…t from them. This holds even if strength is not known and can only be partially inferred from the histories. It follows that a more patient, and strong, player has less incentives to conduce a preemptive attack. The opposite occurs for a more patient, but weaker, player who has greater incentives to preempt the opponent. Since it is impossible for both players to be relatively strong at the same time our results show the di¢ culties with peaceful arrangements and the additional role of perceived strength in our game of warfare.
A remarkable quality of Theorem 2 is that rational players account for the entire stream of future payo¤s and not just one-period ahead payo¤s (as myopic players do). Yet, the signs of one-step look ahead expected values i.e., E w 1 t+1 jF t and E w 2 t+1 jF t , su¢ ce to determine the connection between patience and aggressiveness. This relies on an important observation: the belief about intrinsic strength, ; is a martingale. Intrinsic strength at period t is also a martingale. Therefore, the one-step look ahead values su¢ ce to characterize any …nite step look-ahead values, i.e. E w i t+1 jF t = E w i t+k jF t for any k > 1:
On the methodological side, the key innovation in this section is to use martingale techniques to connect the single-player work of Quah and Strulovici (2013) and the existence of equilibrium results in the two-player work of Ohtsubo (1987) . Similar to the fair case, Yasuda (1985) is utilized to ascertain that there is a unique set of sustainable values (even if mixed strategies are employed). We restrict attention to the strategies identi…ed in Ohtsubo (1987) . These are not necessarily the only strategies that support these payo¤s, but any other equilibrium strategy also achieves the same payo¤s. These characterized values and strategies are not in closed form, but they are closely related to Snell (1952) envelopes used in single player stopping problems. By utilizing martingale techniques we extend the single player results of Quah and Strulovici (2013) to order the values without directly computing them. This permits comparative statics results.
Conclusions and Future Work
Conclusions
This paper develops novel methods for stopping games with and without the addition of social experimentation. The results reveal ine¢ ciencies produced by preemptive moves leading to early destructive confrontations. Unlike repeated games, this ine¢ ciency cannot be alleviated by patience. The results also show that strength is the key mediator on the relation between patience and aggressiveness. Destructive confrontations are triggered sooner by preemptive moves of patient players. The exception to this strategic aggressiveness takes place at the side (if it exists) that is su¢ ciently strong and so, may optimally wait long for a better opportunity to strike.
The reducibility of the process (the game ends when one player starts a confrontation) makes the underlying logic in this game completely di¤erent from those in repeated games. Unlike folk theorems there is no possible threat that the players can make in order to sustain di¤erent equilibrium payo¤s, no matter how patient players might be. This is the fundamental reason why there is no folk theorem in this stopping game with destructive confrontations.
Future work
A natural follow-up to this model would combine our stopping game and a repeated game. Like in this model, there would be a pre-stage whether each player decides, in each period, whether or not to engage the opponent. However, if so, the game would not end, but instead the players would be irrevocably engaged in a repeated game. We conjecture that this will reveal new tensions in the welfare implications of patience. This is left for future work.
Another natural follow-up to is to explore the case whether initiating a …ght can give a direct advantage or disadvantage. This is an important question, and existence and uniqueness of values have already been explored in some settings (usually continuous-time models) within the stopping games literature (see Dynkin (1969) , Neveu (1975) , Rosenberg, Solan, and Vieille (2001) , Szajowski (1993) , Shmaya and Solan (2004) , Ekstrom and Villeneuve (2006) ). However most of these results are focused on existence with involved characterizations of equilibria. Thus, obtaining comparative statics results in this setting is a daunting task. This is left for future work.
A quite di¤erent follow-up would be in social experimentation where players'experimentation are directly payo¤ relevant to other players, and players are not necessarily adversaries. This can …t well situations like adopting new technologies or forming social norms. Our techniques could be utilized to shed light on these phenomena. This is also left for future work.
Appendix
Uniqueness of Values and Random Stopping Times
Mixed Strategies
In the literature of stopping games, there are three concepts of random stopping times. Proving the equivalence of these concepts is challenging, but can be found in Solan, Tsirelson, and Vieille (2012) in the context of stopping games, in Mertens, Sorin, and Zamir (2015) for a broader class of extensive form games. For the convenience of the reader, we give a brief overview of the three de…nitions. Let fF t g be a …ltration of a given probability triple ( ; fF t g; P): Recall that a pure stopping time (strategy) is a function : ! N [ f1g such that f! 2 : (!) = ng 2 F n for all n.
The concepts of mixtures are as follows:
De…nition 7 (Randomized Stopping Time). A randomized stopping time is a nonnegative adapted real valued process = ( n ) n2N[f1g that satis…es P n2N[f1g n (!) = 1 for every ! 2 : The interpretation is that when the true state of the world is ! the probability that the player stops at time n is n (!).
De…nition 8 (Behavior Stopping Time). A behavior stopping time is an adapted
The interpretation is that when the true state of the world is ! the probability that the player stops at time n is n (!) conditional on stopping occurring after time n 1. For brevity we refer to a behavior stopping time as a behavior strategy.
De…nition 9 (Mixed Stopping time). Let I denote the unit interval and B denote the borel algebra with respect to the Lebesgue measure. A mixed stopping time is a (B F) measurable function : I ! N [ f1g such that for every r 2 I, the function (r; ) is a stopping time.
The interpretation is that a pure stopping time is chosen according to the uniform distribution at the beginning and used throughout the stopping problem.
Uniqueness of Values
We adopt the notion of a randomized strategy from Yasuda (1985) , which corresponds to behavior stopping times. We are only going to use behavioral stopping times, but by Solan, Tsirelson, and Vieille (2012) and Mertens, Sorin, and Zamir (2015) we know that other forms of mixtures are covered. For completeness, here we reproduce Yasuda (1985) 's result and proof with a simpli…ed notation to match our setting. The result shows that there is a single sustainable pair of values in equilibrium. Thus, after this section we restrict attention to the equilibrium strategies we identify. Any other equilibrium attains the same values. Interested readers can consult Yasuda (1985) for broader results. 5 Then a random stopping time associated with a behavior strategy i is de…ned by
The interpretation is that player i's behavior strategy describes the odds of stopping, i n ; as a function of the past and current history. The random variable x i n serves as an exogenous randomization device that is independent from the history of the game, and stopping by player i occurs when x i n is less than i n . The de…nitions are consistent because the probability that x i n is less than i n is equal to i n . 6 5 For our purposes, independence from the …ltration means that x n is independent from all random variables adapted to F n such as the odds of winning or the history of the game. 6 The statement of Yasuda's (1985) theorem uses behavioral strategies and do not require the equivalent concept of random stopping times associated with a behavioral strategy. However, we make this de…nition because it is the one Yasuda uses in his proof. If i n is equal to 0 or 1 for every possible history, than the random stopping time associated with the behavior strategy is equivalent to a pure stopping time.
For each player i = 1; 2; let x i n be i.i.d. random variables of uniform distribution on [0; 1] and independent of the original …ltration F n . Let G n be the -…eld generated by F n ; (x i n ) i2f1;2g . Consider the pair of behavior stopping times given by (f
That is the set i n correspond to the set of behavior strategies where player i never starts a con ‡ict before n.
With some abuse of notation let ( 1 ; 2 ) denote min( ( 1 ); ( 2 )), the time of the con ‡ict. By observation 1 we can write any payo¤ in period t, in terms of w
We now note that, for any pair of equilibrium strategies ( 1 ); ( 2 ), confrontation occurs, almost surely, in …nite time. That is, equilibrium payo¤s must be achieved by …ghting strategies, so that i n and i n ; i 2 f1; 2g are well-de…ned bounds.
7 To see this, …rst note that payo¤s never exceeds v and so, continuation payo¤ has to be less than v, < 1. Letp 1 ( ) < 1 and p 2 ( ) > 0 be such thatp 1 ( )(v+l) l > v and p 2 ( )(v+l)+v > v. Then, in equilibrium, player 1 must confront wherever the probability of victory exceedsp 1 ( ), and player 2 must confront wherever the probability of victory exceeds 1 p 2 ( ): This follows because in these cases the expected payo¤s obtained by immediate confrontation exceeds the maximum discounted payo¤s that can be achieved by not confronting. Thus, in equilibrium, confrontation occurs either before or at any period t such that p t exceedsp 1 ( ) or is below 1 p 2 ( ). Now, fp t g has full support on [0; 1] and a continuous density. So, every period, p t exceedsp 1 ( ) or is below 1 p 2 ( ) with positive probability. Given that fp t g is i.i.d., by the Borel-Cantelli lemma, almost surely, p t exceedsp 1 ( ) or is below 1 p 2 ( ). Hence, almost surely, in equilibrium, confrontation happens in …nite time.
We now reproduce the Theorem 3.1 of Yasuda (1985) (and its proof) adapted to our setting.
Theorem 3 (Yasuda) . Assume that
Then for each i, Proof. We reproduce the proof of Yasuda (1985) because we believe the proof is insightful. The approach taken by Yasuda (1985) is to de…ne a value operator that every equilibrium value needs to satisfy and show that there exists a unique set of values that can satisfy this operator. The analysis in our case is simpli…ed since in our game the payo¤s arising from a confrontation are bounded.The reader may skip it and go directly to corollary 3. However, the notation in the original representation is challenging. Here we present the argument in a notation which is (to us) simpler to follow. First observe that the assumptions in theorem 3 implies:
Now, consider the following two by two game: Notice that any equilibrium payo¤ has to satisfy 6.1.2. Now let, (^ 1 n ;^ 2 n ) be a solution to 6.1.2 and^
Lemma 1. For each n the following equalities hold:
and analogously 
On the other hand since^ 2 satis…es 6.1.2, it has to be the case that
jF n ) for each m n. Since 2 was arbitary letting m ! 1 we havê
Symmetric arguments deliver^
Corollary 3. Our stopping games with behavior strategies has a unique pair of values that can be sustained in equilibrium.
Proof. The inequalities in Yasuda (1985) 's assumptions hold because for all n; l < w i n < v. Hence, i n = i n ; i 2 f1; 2g. The corollary is now achieved because any equilibrium payo¤s (for player i at period n) given by^ Notice that corollary 3 only asserts uniqueness of sustainable equilibrium values. There are potentially multiple equilibrium strategies that attain these values.
Known Strength 6.2.1 Informal Description of the Proof Strategy for Theorem 1
By Yasuda (1985) , there is a unique pair of equilibrium values. By Mertens (2002), we know there exists an equilibrium in behavior Markov strategies. When both players use a Markovian strategy, the value functions associated with any pair of Markovian strategies has a time independent structure due to the i.i.d. odds of victories. We use the i.i.d. distributions (on the odds of victory) to show that, in our setting, any equilibrium in behavior Markov strategies is an equilibrium in hitting strategies with a …xed threshold. Thus, there exists an equilibrium in hitting strategies with …xed thresholds. The computation of the (equilibrium) threshold is straightforward. While these computations only characterizes a particular equilibrium that Mertens (2002) has shown to exist, the equilibrium payo¤s that it delivers are the only ones in this game as shown by Yasuda (1985) .
Proof of Theorem 1
Step 1: Equilibria in Markovian strategies De…nition 11. A behavior Markovian strategy, is a behavior stopping time, where ( n jF n ) ( n jp n ).
The interpretation of a behavior Markovian strategy is that when the true state of the world is ! the probability that the player stops at time n is n (!) conditional on stopping occurring after time n 1; only depends on the n th coordinate of !. That is, the probability that the player stops at time n conditional on stopping occurring after time n 1, only depends on the realization p n .
Note that a behavior Markovian strategy de…nes a mapping i : [0; 1] ! [0; 1], where if, at period n, the odds of victory is p n and no confrontation has occurred until period n, then player i stops at period n with probability i (p n ). Thus, given that fp n g is i.i.d., the following observation holds.
Observation 2. When both players employ behavior Markovian strategies, the probability of a confrontation happening at period t + 1, conditional on stopping occurring after time t does not depend on the history before and at period t and therefore this probability is a number (denoted ) given by:
Observation 3. When both players employ behavior Markovian strategies, expected payo¤ from a confrontation at period t + 1, conditional on stopping occurring after time t; are also independent of history until period t, including the realization at period t therefore these payo¤s are numbers (denoted 1 and 2 ) given by:
Observation 4. When both players employ behavior Markovian strategies, expected continuation payo¤s denoted by E(V i ( ( i ); ( j ))jF t ) are also independent of history until period t; including the realization at period t and is given by:
De…nition 12. A pure strategy i is called a hitting strategy, if 9C
That is player i stops the …rst time the realization p t of the processp t belongs to C i . The C i is …xed for all periods t. If C is of the form [k; 1] or [0; k] we call it a hitting strategy with …xed threshold k. By de…nition hitting strategies are Markovian.
De…nition 13. The best response of player i against player j's random stopping time associated with a behavior strategy (
is a behavior stopping time that satis…es:
) is a behavior stopping time of player i that is a best response to a (potentially behavior) stopping time ( j ) of player j. Lemma 2 holds in our stopping game with an i.i.d. uniform process fp t g. Lemma 2. In equilibrium if both players employ a behavior Markov strategy, then both players must be employing a hitting strategy with a …xed threshold.
Proof. Suppose there exists an equilibrium in behavior Markovian strategies. Let ( j ) be a randomized stopping time associated with a behavior Markovian strategy and let b i t ( ( j )) be a best response to ( j ) that is a behavior Markovian strategy. Let V i (b i ( ( j )); ( j )) denote the continuation payo¤ for player i when player i employs the best response b i ( ( j )) and player j employs ( j ). Since both players employ strategies that are Markovian, due to observation 4 it must be the case that for any period t;
) for all t: But then for any period t and any realization w i t ; the problem of player i is as follows:
Since v i ( i ( ( j )); ( j )) is bounded above and below by respectively v and l there exists a unique p i such that v i (b i ( ( j )); ( j )) = w i t : Thus, wlog letting player i be player 1.
arg max
But then 1 = t () p t > p 1 thus the best response to a behavior Markov strategy is a hitting strategy with a …xed threshold, with a measure 0 indifference in p 1 ; which we break in favor of a confrontation. Given that hitting strategies with a …xed thresholds are Markovian, there exists an equilibrium in hitting strategies with …xed thresholds.
In step 2, we now identify an equilibrium in hitting strategies with …xed thresholds.
Step 2: Identifying an equilibrium in hitting strategies Let 1 = infft 0 j p t p 1 g and 2 = infft 0 j p t p 2 g denote two hitting strategies, where without loss of generality we assume p 1 1=2 and p 2 1=2.
Letting F (p) and f (p) denote the cdf and pdf of the i.i.d. stochastic process governing the odds. Now we start with any i.i.d. distribution and we will plug the uniform density as we proceed.
With hitting strategies the overall payo¤s to the players are given by:
In particular, for any history, the continuation payo¤s with hitting strategies denoted E(V i ( )jF t ) are also given by:
The underlying process is i.i.d. and the strategies are hitting strategies. Therefore the continuation payo¤s are constant across time (including period 0) and independent of history. Hence with a slight abuse of notation we let E(V i ( )) = U i ( ) = E(V i ( )jF t ) for any t denote the continuation values. Furthermore since the hitting strategies are identi…ed by two thresholds, we will simplify the notation by using notions of strategy and threshold interchangeably.
For a pair of thresholds (p 1 ; p 2 ) that belongs (0:5; 1) (0; 0:5) to be an equilibrium the thresholds must satisfy the following system of 6 equations:
The …rst two equations show that at the threshold the players have to be indi¤erent between confrontation and not. The third and the fourth equations deliver the continuation values. The last two inequalities ensures that the payo¤s associated with the thresholds have to be higher than ex-ante immediate confrontation.
The system of equations 6.2.1 can be re-written as follows:
So now we solve for E(V 1 ( )) and E(V 2 ( )) by combining the third and the fourth equation with the …rst and the second equations.
f (p)dp
e. the total probability of no con ‡ict, we have the following:
The system above is a necessary condition for equilibria with general i.i.d. distributions. We now plug in the uniform density to the system, i.e. f (p) = 1 and F (p) = p: With some algebra, the solution is
Finally, we now verify the inequalities in the …fth and sixth equations. They hold given that v < l and < 1. This follows because
2 )
The inequality on the sixth equation (which refers to E(V 2 ( ))) also holds and the calculation is completely analogous.
Proof of Corollary 1
Taking the derivative of p 1 in 6.2.2 with respect to and simplifying yields
We now show that the derivative is negative whenever v l: To see that the numerator is negative:
Which simpli…es to:
Proof of Corollary 2 Now, we will see the e¤ect of changing just one player's discount factor when initially they start from the same . Here we consider small changes around the initial equilibrium we found. Using the …rst and third equations in 6.2.1 we construct f 1 (p 1 ; p 2 ; 1 ; 2 ) and using the second and fourth equations we construct f 2 (p 1 ; p 2 ; 1 ; 2 ) as follows:
It is straightforward to see that if
2 ) we have both f 1 and f 2 equal to zero. That is, f 1 ( p 1 ; p 2 ; ; ) = 0 and f 2 ( p 1 ; p 2 ; ; ) = 0:
With some algebra, the Jacobian can be explicitly computed and shown to be non-singular. Hence, we can use the implicit function theorem on the system of two equations above. Let p( ; ) denote the vector of thresholds ( p 1 ( ; ); p 2 ( ; )) where both discount factors are equal to . By the implicit function theorem,
Plugging in the values of p 1 ( ; ) and p 2 ( ; ) from 6.2.2, we can precisely calculate the partial derivatives. In particular the signs of the partial derivatives are as follows.
The proof is now concluded because an increase in p 1 is corresponds to a decrease in aggressiveness whereas an increase in p 2 corresponds to an increase.
Informal Description of the Proof Strategy for Theorem 2
The proof of this theorem is in three steps. By Yasuda (1985) , there is a unique set of equilibrium values. We then use a characterization of equilibrium values, due to (Ohtsubo 1987) . The second step identi…es martingale properties of equilibrium values. The …nal step utilizes a lemma (lemma 3) along with martingale properties in step 2 to obtain an ordering of stopping times (i.e., the comparative statics relating aggressiveness and strength). Similar to the i.i.d. case, the equilibrium values are unique, but there are potentially multiple equilibrium strategies that sustain these values.
Proof of Theorem 2
Step 1: Characterization of continuation values The w i t in de…nition 2.4 is crucial to identify and characterize an equilibrium. In that direction for each m 2 N, let the following sequences of random variables f( This construction is very similar to the construction of a Snell envelope, extended to accommodate 2 players. Here let us remind that the Snell envelope is the value of a discounted optimal stopping problem with a single decision maker. Hence, it is the smallest supermartingale majorant of the discounted process that is being stopped optimally. The calculation of the Snell envelope relies on a similar backward induction argument, where …rst the stopping problem is assumed to stop at an arbitrary time (m in the above construction) and then the values for any n < m is calculated by taking the maximum of the current stopped value and the expected continuation payo¤. Finally the envelope is identi…ed as the limit of the values as m tends to in…nity. Further details and properties of the construction can be found in Snell (1952) . There is a crucial observation to be made here. Both the Snell envelope and the construction of Ohtsubo (1987) is the limit of a process that is eventually stopped. The main implication is that these constructions rely on stopping (confrontation) happening almost surely, which is true in our case due to confrontations being destructive.
It is shown in Ohtsubo (1987) that n = lim m!1 m n and n = lim m!1 m n are well de…ned. Similar to the Snell envelope, the P-limit of these sequences de…ne the essential suprema, which was shown to be equal to the equilibrium payo¤s in the stopping game of (Ohtsubo 1987) . So, Ohtsubo (1987) characterizes a pair of equilibrium values using backward induction, and shows associated stopping times that attain these values. Here we present Ohtsubo (1987) 2 ) is an equilibrium. Here as is usual with Snell envelopes, a closed form characterization of the equilibrium strategies is not obtained. However, we can still obtain comparative statics results.
The next proposition characterizes the optimal continuation condition for equilibrium strategies in Ohtsubo (1987) . Proposition 1. For an arbitrary belief n and current probability p n the following inequalities have to hold simultaneously for the game to continue to period n + 1
The continuation condition in proposition 1 does not involve any discount factors on the left hand side. Thus pinning down how the right hand side changes with respect to the discount factor is crucial for the desired comparative statics results. The next step highlights the martingale properties associated with the continuation values (seen in the right-hand side of the equation above). This simpli…es the problem of obtaining comparative statics results.
Step 2: Martingale properties (1 p)f 1 (p) + pf 2 (p)dp
(f 1 (p)(2p 1) + f 2 (p)(1 2p))dp
((1 p)f 1 (p) + pf 2 (p))dp l:
by a similar calculation we have (f 1 (p)(2p 1) + f 2 (p)(1 2p))dp
((1 p)f 1 (p) + pf 2 (p))dp + v:
It is well established that, the belief t is a martingale, and consequently w i t are martingales w.r.t to t since they are just linear functions of t . Now, we observe that given the other player's strategy, the problem of a player is to maximize a stopped martingale, which is again a martingale by (Williams 1991) .
Step 3: Ordering of stopping times Notice that the strategies identi…ed by Ohtsubo (1987) are Markovian (where the state space is the space of beliefs). This follows because the strategies in 6.2.3 and 6.2.4 only depend on the current belief n and the current odds of winning p n :Thus, wlog (see (Puterman 2014) ) for any given belief, we can rescale time and only consider time 0. Given the other player's strategy, and looking at the time 0 problem, we can rewrite the continuation Given that ^ , ^ 1 A But then, stopping earlier at 1 ( ) is weakly better o¤ on ; so the stopping rule de…ned as minf 1 ( ); 1 (^ )g dominates 1 (^ ) contradicting its optimality.
